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Introduction 
When marginalized castes and classes in India share unequally in the material gains of 
development, how do they respond to the invocation of development in political discourse?  
Scholars have pointed to the ‘polyvocality’ of development as a discourse of power and 
entitlement.
1
 Yet how do marginalized groups make sense of this hegemonic discourse in 
light of their own experiences and material circumstances?  
We address this question through in-depth interviews with marginalized groups in Gujarat, 
specifically Other Backward Castes (OBCs), Dalits, and Muslims. In Gujarat, OBCs 
constitute approximately 40 percent of a total population of 62.7 million, while Dalits form 
7.1 percent of the population and Muslims roughly 9 percent.
2
 Dalits and Muslims are over-
represented among the poor; among Dalits 70 percent are employed as casual labourers or are 
self-employed in the informal economy
3
 and more than 50 percent live at or below the 
poverty line,
4
 while roughly 38 percent of Muslims live below the poverty line. Despite the 
ongoing material, cultural and symbolic subordination within the caste-class-religious order 
of liberalizing Gujarat, electoral polls since 2002 have shown a drift among lower caste 
groups towards the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which has increasingly sought to position 
itself as a party of development. There is no comparable data on the Muslim vote for the BJP, 
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but anecdotal and specialist evidence suggests a growing shift among some Muslim voters 
towards the BJP.
5
 Given that the BJP’s leadership and social base is largely upper caste 
Hindu, both within Gujarat and across India,  it is important to assess which marginalized 
groups tend to support the BJP and its development agenda, and why.
6
  
We use a combination of secondary historical and interview data to move beyond voter-based 
studies in order to show how ‘party articulation’7 produces complex forms of identification 
among subordinated groups with the ideas and imaginaries of dominant castes and classes. 
Put in Gramscian terms, our concern is with how hegemony is produced in contexts where 
inequalities are pervasive and growing.    
As a capitalist developmental state Gujarat offers a glimpse into one of many possible futures 
for global capitalism in the so-called developing world. The architect of its recent 
development agenda, Narendra Modi, is both the leader of the BJP and, since 2014, the Prime 
Minister of India. Although Gujarat has a long history of business-friendly governments, 
through the liberalization years of the 1990s and beyond Gujarat’s global reputation has 
grown. Its high growth rates in industrial and rural sectors have been fuelled by a strong 
export-oriented policy aimed at attracting foreign investment, light state regulation of 
business, and a relatively unorganized, low-wage labour force. Although Gujarat’s 
developmental policy regime is rooted in the policies of the Congress Party during the 1970s 
and 1980s, it has been more firmly consolidated under the Hindu nationalist BJP since 1992, 
and specifically since 1995 under the leadership of Modi. This stridently pro-business, 
deregulated market model is politically bolstered by two related factors: first, a historical 
legacy of weak working class links that was reinforced by the retrenchment of textile workers 
since the 1980s, and second, the infusion of a specific idea of ‘development’ into the 
reordering of caste and Hindu-Muslim relations in the state, epitomized by the ideological 
and spatial transformation of both within Ahmedabad. The reordering of caste and religious 
relations in the city have to be understood in the  context of the long history of communal 
violence in the state which was punctuated by the unprecedented state-sponsored 
organization of violence against Muslims in 2002. In February 2002 large-scale communal 
violence across many parts of Gujarat followed the burning of a train carriage in which 58 
Hindu pilgrims were killed. Muslims were blamed and nearly 2000 people were killed in the 
orgy of violence that followed. Several members of the ruling BJP were later indicted for 
their involvement, while eyewitness accounts and successive investigations have revealed the 
coordinated nature of the attacks, including the high level participation of BJP ministers.  
This event has left its mark not only upon Hindu-Muslim relations, but equally importantly, 
has enabled the BJP to consolidate a pan-Hindu voting bloc by referring to Muslims as a 
“security threat”.8  
Our goal is to understand how and why, in the years of relative urban peace since 2002 
during which communal riots have virtually disappeared, such a bloc has proved so durable. 
One measure of this durability is voting patterns; as table 1 illustrates, lower caste support for 
the BJP is fairly stable at between 27 and 30 percent among Dalits, and 54 percent among 
OBCs.  These figures suggest that there is some stability to this not-negligible support, 
although they also show that Dalits are less likely to uphold this support for the BJP. 
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TABLE 1 HERE 
  
Several commentators have argued that the BJP’s remarkable electoral success and 
hegemony rests upon its ability to incorporate marginalized castes and classes into its 
communal (Hindutva) agenda.
9
 Dalits and OBCs are said to aspire to inclusion in the BJP’s 
fold, identifying Muslims as their primary antagonists and threat to their security. Others 
argue that Dalits and OBCs vote for the BJP because of the resources and patronage offered 
by the ruling party.
10
  
While both arguments contain some truth, our comparison of Dalit, OBC and Muslim 
perceptions and subjectivities reveals a highly fragmented picture of support and 
ambivalence. Aside from the historical contextualization of our argument, we draw upon 
thirty-two in-depth interviews that we conducted between August and December 2012 with 
two generations of Dalit, OBC and Muslim men and women employed in the urban informal 
economy of Ahmedabad (see Appendix 1). Although most participants were lower caste 
Hindus, we conducted interviews with several Muslim men and women who resided in 
primarily Hindu localities or within Muslim areas of Ahmedabad in order to gain a better 
understanding of how the rhetoric and practices of development resonated with their lives, 
particularly in the aftermath of the repression and severe exclusion that followed the 
communal violence of 2002. Moreover, the generational emphasis in our interviews allowed 
us to elicit temporally sensitive reflections from our respondents, who by relating their life 
stories provided  insight into  how the idea of ‘development’ resonated with their changing 
fortunes and mobility across generations.  
Although we sought to explore the more mundane aspects of how subordinate castes make 
sense of, and relate the idea of development to aspects of their lives, conducting our 
interviews during the run-up to the December 2012 Gujarat State Assembly elections was 
extremely fortuitous. We were able to observe the effects of the BJP’s articulatory work in 
greater depth than might have been otherwise possible. In addition to interviews, we gleaned 
a considerable amount of information through informal chats with neighbours and people on 
the street, attendance at political rallies, and reading the daily newspapers.   
[Picture 1 here] 
[Elections in Ahmedabad 2012] 
Our respondents expressed sentiments and perceptions beyond interest-based calculations. 
For many, the idea of development was meaningful because it spoke to their mundane 
concerns about security, social homogeneity and recognition. However, the same respondents 
voiced deep frustrations and bitterness with their lack of opportunities in a rapidly growing 
urban economy, as well as the relocation of families because of urban regeneration schemes 
carried out in the name of development. Our findings thus reveal a variety of ways in which 
these groups have translated the BJP’s rhetorical claims and practices of development in 
Gujarat into meaningful ideas and practices for resolving mundane concerns of security, 
identity and spatial order.
11
   
We argue that these mundane understandings of development are a by-product of the political 
processes that link (or articulate) different constituencies of people, while excluding others, 
through a common idea or signifier.  Indeed, these processes not only exclude some 
constituencies, but construct them as the ‘other’. In other words, development becomes a 
means of excluding some groups who are viewed as inimical to the values and security of 
those included within ‘the developed’. We treat ‘development’ as both a signifier of a process 
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of social reorganization as well as the material (if differentially experienced) transformations 
in livelihoods, built environment, space, and security. The concept of development is 
inherently polysemic because it encompasses both actual status achievements and the 
aspirations of individuals in a broader milieu (region or nation), thus making it possible for 
differently situated people with conflicting interests and experiences to recognize to some 
common ground. The discursive power of development derives from the possibility of 
making such a common reference.   
Our analysis of development discourse and practice in Gujarat shows, however, that there is 
no single meta-narrative of development shared by all; instead, the larger narrative is 
operationalized through several smaller narratives such as security, spatial ordering, and 
identity  that appeal in different ways to different constituencies. While the BJP has to some 
degree succeeded in establishing the idea of ‘development’ as a common referent across 
urban castes and classes, underlying resistance and ambivalence among Dalits, OBCs and 
Muslims attest to the internal fissures within this project.  This is because while there is a 
strong overlap between caste, class and ethnic/communal subordination in Gujarat (as in 
India), the longer-term process of industrial development and now economic liberalization, 
together with state welfare and affirmative action programs, have led to a growing ‘neo’ 
middle class particularly among the OBCs but also to an extent Dalits and Muslims. While 
terms such as ‘middle class’ and ‘lower middle class’ are notoriously difficult to define, data 
shows that the fall in poverty over the past two decades has given rise to a substantial section 
of the population that aspires to middle class status, yet finds itself outside the reach of 
middle class stability.
12
 Members of this class have some disposable income compared to 
those below the poverty line yet find themselves perched between the poor and the middle 
classes because they lack substantial savings or stable jobs despite formal education. Jaffrelot 
(2013) among others refers to this section as the ‘neo-middle class,’ which the BJP defined as 
its core urban target in the Gujarat state election manifesto of 2007.
13
 The growth of this class 
over the past two decades has broken down stable caste categories, leading to internal class 
differentiation among Dalits, OBCs and Muslims. This differentiation, we argue, 
simultaneously bolsters and weakens the hegemonic notion of development as some members 
of these marginalized groups begin identifying with the dominant ideology.  
As we subsequently discuss, our respondents did not merely experience development as a 
remote, top-down project. Instead, given its frequent employment in both popular and 
political discourse, they had come to accept the idea as meaningful in some way although 
many expressed considerable ambivalence. While one may debate the use of the term 
‘neoliberal’ to describe Gujarat or India’s model of economic growth, neoliberal tenets of 
deregulation, free markets, the paramount importance of economic growth and an emphasis 
on technocrats favourable to neoliberal models are core aspects of how development under 
Prime Minister Modi is being imagined and implemented. Anthropologists who have 
explored the local ambiguities and processes through which a neoliberal concept of 
development is implemented have similarly argued that rather than being an imposition from 
above, it is an on the ground, locally driven and historically contingent process.
14
 For 
example, Aihwa Ong (2007:3; 2006) has suggested that neoliberalism is best understood as a 
migratory technology that co-exists with other political rationalities. In non-western contexts, 
she argues, where vast inequalities overlap with situated identities based on religion, caste 
and ethnicity, neoliberal technologies create new distinctions through notions of self-
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improving, cosmopolitan and capable citizens, who are hailed as exceptions to the prevailing 
cultural norms.
15
  
Yet our Ahmedabad-based account shows that although a discursive distinction between self-
improving, cosmopolitan middle class subjects and recalcitrant, marginalized groups in India 
is emerging, subjectivities among the marginalized do not remain untouched by this 
distinction. Instead, many of our respondents demonstrated a dynamic, if not critical 
identification with the ideas and practices of ‘development’ by partaking in the discourse on 
self-improving and mobile citizens who have left behind the era of Congress-led inefficiency 
and slow development. In other words, these respondents aspire to the ‘development story’ 
even when reflecting an ambivalence about this narrative in a way that speaks to the gap 
between their material realities and the promises made to them in the BJP development 
narrative.  
The Historical Origins of Developmentalism in Gujarat  
Gujarat has one of the most dynamic regional economies in India, with the highest growth 
rate in the country. Between 2011 and 2012 its annual economic growth averaged around 
10%, which was higher than the rest of India (at roughly 8.5%).
16
 It was one of the first states 
to begin economic reforms in 1992 (under Congress rule), and has developed a cross party 
commitment to market reforms that has proved elusive in many other states. Although the 
commitment to making Gujarat a beacon of business-friendly capitalism arose during the 
BJP’s consolidation of power, a longer-term view of the growth of the ‘Gujarat model’ is 
necessary. The industrial base of the economy and the significance of manufacturing 
compared with other states was a characteristic of the economy well before BJP rule 
commenced in the 1990s. The historical advantages of a trader and artisanal base, together 
with the successful transformation of upper caste farmers into industrial capitalists was given 
political shape as a form of developmentalism
17
 by successive parties in government. Thus 
the first coalition in support of the developmental role of the state was forged by the Congress 
Party between 1960 and 1975, integrating a wide base of upper, intermediate and lower 
castes.
18
 Of special significance with this coalition and others that followed was the relatively 
weak opposition to the state from subordinate classes (ibid.).
19
 
Reservations as Signifier: 1970s and 1980s 
The first break from the Congress Party’s broad political articulation occurred during the 
Emergency of 1977. A growing crisis within the Congress Party during this period was 
reflected in a split within the party in Gujarat and the emergence of Jinabhai Darji as a 
frontrunner in the state-level party. At a time when the Congress was facing declining public 
support because of its authoritarian measures during the Emergency, Darji forged a pro-
adivasi
20
 agenda, for example by advocating the abolition of hali pratha, the system of 
providing bonded adivasi labour to upper caste Patels.
21
 The Congress moved in the direction 
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of an explicitly pro-poor articulation under Darji, by creating a coalition of lower castes, 
tribes and Muslims who together formed 60% of the vote share in the state.
22
 This 
unprecedented entry of subaltern groups into the political sphere was achieved, however, 
without significantly alienating agrarian or industrial capital. At the core of Congress’ 
development strategy was an extensive industrialization policy launched in conjunction with 
the private sector in areas such as power development, electronics and fertilizers.
23
 In 
conjunction with this pro-private sector approach, Congress Party Chief Minister 
Madhavsingh Solanki (1980-1985 and 1989-1990) launched an extensive web of social 
welfare programs such as free mid-day meal schemes for primary school children, free 
education for girls until university, and food-grain allotments for families earning below INR 
5000.
24
 These policies enabled a lower caste Chief Minister and a cabinet that represented 
many Scheduled Castes and Tribes to maintain relatively stable rule.
25
 This state of affairs, 
however, concealed growing resentment among the upper castes towards their exclusion from 
political power. Indeed, state welfare policies led to a decline in patron-clientelism between 
the upper and lower castes which in turn sparked violence by upper caste Patels against Dalits 
in particular.  What proved Solanki’s undoing, however, was his decision in 1985 to raise 
quotas for Dalits in government jobs and educational institutions from 10 percent to 27 
percent.
26
 The upper caste reaction was ferocious and violent, as they perceived increased 
reservations as a direct encroachment on their ability to secure permanent jobs. Levels of 
violence against Dalits continued to grow during this period.  
Given the strength of the Congress Party in Gujarat during the 1980s, the subsequent 
ascendancy of a Hindu nationalist upper caste-led articulation and its partial incorporation of 
OBCs and Dalits pose a historical puzzle. In particular, why did dominant castes turn to 
violent protests against Dalits during the late 1980s then switch mid-stream to targeting 
Muslims in the early 1990s?
27
 This abrupt re-coding of the idiom and targets of violence is 
inexplicable without some attention to the role of political articulation. By adopting religious 
nationalism (Hindutva) as its core strategy and identity project in Gujarat, the BJP attempted 
to break the political alliance among lower-castes which underpinned the Congress Party’s 
welfare developmental model, and replace this with a new alliance that drew together upper-
castes, Dalits and Adivasis against Muslims. This involved repeated communal violence, 
persistent propaganda and community organizing, and the use of religious processions 
through localities where Hindus and Muslims lived in close proximity.
28
 Shani (2005) has 
compellingly argued that religious communalism was in fact the medium and grammar of 
caste struggle. As older forms of caste patronage were disappearing, OBCs and Dalits were 
increasingly politicized, thus gaining in importance political parties in search of a majority. In 
this context, the BJP tried to forge a pact between upper and lower castes by shifting the 
fault-line to religion and portraying Muslims as the enemy. It is this interweaving of caste and 
religion through common signifiers of development that, we argue, has underscored the BJP 
developmental project since 1991.  
A crucial element that has enabled such an articulation is the historically weak organized 
opposition from lower castes and classes in Gujarat in general and Ahmedabad in particular. 
The sheer size of the informal sector (over 90% of the working population in Ahmedabad), 
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relative paucity of social security schemes, and harsh working conditions, especially in textile 
factories,
29
 has resulted in almost no political representation for most lower caste workers in 
the city.  Weak associational links among subordinate groups has been attributed to the 
historical dominance of Gandhian reconciliation traditions and non-conflictual modes of 
organizing employed by the Textile Labour Association (TLA).
30
 In addition, both the 
communist and socialist left are organizationally weak in Gujarat, and trade unions and rural 
organizations of workers tend to be relatively ineffective in their use of extra-parliamentary 
activities such as strikes. The net result has been deterioration in the conditions of workers, as 
the relatively stable employment conditions offered by the textile industry in the past have 
been replaced by casualization and informal employment. This process began in 1985 when 
Congress Party liberalization policies led to a loss of almost 100,000 textile jobs in 
Ahmedabad.
31
 Although new factories arose on the outskirts of the city, they paid less than 
half the wages workers were accustomed to, and provided almost no benefits.
32
 Only 20 
percent of laid-off workers found wage employment and these carried no benefits for 
sickness, insurance or provident fund.
33
  The remaining workers had to accept work as 
contract labourers with low pay and extreme insecurity, or become self-employed. This event 
signalled the breakdown of the implied social contract between state, businesses and workers 
and the demise of the TLA as a representative body.
34
 The 1980s thus constituted a critical 
moment in the lives of Ahmedabad’s urban workers, a point repeatedly expressed to us, 
especially by Dalit former workers. It was in this context that the erstwhile Jan Sangh 
(predecessor of the BJP) was able to manufacture Hindu-Muslim riots and channel worker 
angst against mill workers. 
New Articulations 
Scholarship on caste and class relations in Gujarat during the 1990s attests to a growing 
communalization of political tactics and discourse beginning in the 1980s which polarized 
Hindus and Muslims. This had the effect of creating new caste-based alliances without 
disturbing the dominance of specific castes within these equations.
35
 This was achieved by 
using established Hindu-right organizations such as Bharat Sevashram and Hindu Milan 
Mandir to carry out street-level welfare activities, with the aim of uplifting the lower castes. 
These groups believe that the sudra (lower caste) has been unfairly rejected from Hindu 
society, even though they are essentially hard working and able to bear much suffering. 
Hence their exclusion is seen as the cause of the weakening of Hindus as a whole.
36
 The use 
of street-based, neighbourhood mobilization by these groups, including riots and violence, 
drew a line between Hindus and Muslims, while enjoining Dalits and OBCs to enter the 
Hindu fold by becoming participants in the violence.
37
 While its success in recruiting Dalits 
has been mixed, in recent years the BJP has undoubtedly gained more support from OBCs.
38
 
As Jaffrelot argue, the BJP has, in fact, been “plebeanized” under Modi.39 The party is still 
perceived as a dominant caste party, but this perception shifts as one moves from the rural to 
urban milieu.  
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The mixed evidence on voting patterns by caste offers a partial picture of the process of 
political articulation in Gujarat. A better understanding of how articulation has worked on the 
ground can be gained by examining the BJP’s discursive strategy and its reception among 
subordinate castes. A key feature of this discursive strategy was the side-lining of alternative 
solidarity strategies and alliances based on KHAM (unity between lower and middle caste 
Hindus and Muslims) as well as reservations for lower castes, in favour of an appeal to a neo-
middle class identity. OBCs have formed a crucial part of this articulation strategy, as they 
constitute 43% of the State’s population, but are allocated only 27% of reservations. In other 
words the BJP perceives them as a crucial source of new articulations without a need to 
provide them the benefits of affirmative action. In place of such benefits the BJP offers OBCs 
a place in its pan-Hindu focus on development.  Indeed, some of our OBC (as well Dalit) 
respondents partially identified with this BJP vision despite the fact that, however precarious 
their livelihoods and insecure their conditions of work, they earned on average a high enough 
income to fail to qualify for assistance such as government subsidized food and fuel.   
The strength of the Gujarat BJP’s articulation strategy must, however, be equally attributed to 
the strong charismatic leadership of Narendra Modi. By dubbing himself a vikas purush 
(development man), Modi rhetorically combined the ideal of masculine strength with a steely 
determination to bring prosperity, order and technological progress to every Gujarati. This 
discourse, as Jaffrelot argues, “banalized” Hindutva and linked regional pride (Gujarat 
asmita) with ‘development’ to form an interlocking signifier that reached across castes, 
classes, and political borders, also drawing in the Gujarati diaspora.
40
 In his speeches, Modi 
counter-poses the BJP’s development orientation and entrepreneurial outlook to the Congress 
Party’s slow-paced, bureaucratic mentality and the putative corruption of big government. 
This discursive frame contrasts a chaotic past (under Congress) to the march of progress since 
the 1990s. For example, in his 2012 Foundation Day speech, Chief Minister Modi said:  
If we look behind, the first decade of the 21st Century became a decade of 
development, even though it began with many calamities like unforgettable 
earthquake, upheavals in cooperative banks and drought in 2001. Adversaries 
wished Gujarat should never rise, but were proved wrong. Gujarat virtually 
rose from the debris, converted obstacles into opportunities. We could see the 
results of our relentless efforts paying dividends. Any discussion on 
development anywhere in the world would remain incomplete without a 
mention of Gujarat’s development. The reasons or the forces behind this 
success story are the six-crore people of Gujarat, their unity, brotherhood and 
accepting the path to peace.
41
 
In this context development signifies a market-based path to progress and prosperity, with the 
removal of poverty through more efficient, non-bureaucratic modes of governance. In other 
words, ‘government’ is replaced by ‘governance’.  
Liberalization and the New Politics 
The city of Ahmedabad offers a window into the uneven spatial dispersal of development that 
has intensified under the liberalization regime. During the first wave of industrialization in 
the nineteenth century, textile mills were located on the outskirts of the walled city.  
Residential life was organized into pols, narrow side lanes which were divided by caste and 
community. This created a basis for associationalism and patronage between the wealthy and 
poor on the basis of caste.  Gradually the wealthy moved to private houses in the western 
parts of the city, leaving behind the textile workers who became increasingly ghettoized in 
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eastern Ahmedabad. Most of our interviews were conducted in the former walled city and 
eastern sections where a clear class division remains. Very few of our interviewees had found 
regular employment in the emerging industries or services, and had resorted to casual jobs 
such as bricklaying, construction, auto rickshaw driving, and vending.   
Although the distinction between the two halves of the city is important, the social structure 
reveals much greater complexity. As a result of affirmative action, housing, welfare and other 
guaranteed income policies enacted by the former Congress government, as well as because 
of jobs generated by industrial growth, some members of the working class have experienced 
a measure of upward mobility. For men such as MP, a former Dalit trade union leader, state 
housing, affirmative action opportunities and other welfare benefits under Congress in the 
1970s enabled his family to climb out of poverty. His two sons own small businesses, and the 
family lives in a primarily Dalit middle class neighbourhood in Chandkheda in north 
Ahmedabad. Castes in Gujarat no longer form homogeneous entities because of class 
differentiation.
42
   
Several authors have argued that moving into a neo-middle class position leads to a strong 
BJP identification because aspirational voters identify with the BJP’s emphasis on market 
opportunity, entrepreneurialism, and rapid growth.
43
 For example, rural Kolis (an OBC caste) 
tend to vote for the Congress Party (53 percent) but vote for the BJP when they shift to a 
semi-urban or urban context (65 percent).  Yet our findings suggested that there is no firm 
correspondence between class position and identification with the idea of ‘development’. 
While several of our respondents who had experienced relocation as a result of Ahmedabad’s 
redevelopment or those who were living in particularly precarious circumstances were critical 
of Modi’s specific development discourse, others expressed contingent support for Modi and 
his claims about development.  These respondents identified with the idea of development 
through more immediate preoccupations with security, order, honour and status. For them, 
development under the BJP is meaningful because they have experienced improvements in 
their daily lives.  
Modi has drawn a clear distinction between the chaotic and unruly past of the Congress and 
the stability, order and prosperity brought by the BJP to Gujarat.  This discursive equation of 
development with order and the juxtaposition of an ‘unruly and chaotic past’ against a future 
of possible plenty were also repeatedly noted by our interviewees.  Thus GDM, a Dalit casual 
labourer, put it:  
“Since the BJP came there have been no more riots. We live peacefully…ever 
since we came here, we have been able to live in peace. It is not as it used to 
be. There is progress everywhere. It feels very nice. It seems like it has 
become like America now. Gurukul mall, nice cinemas, and long roads have 
been built…. It looks nice from all angles. It makes you wonder, that there 
was nothing here before, and now it is so beautiful…. When you go out 
somewhere, you cannot recognise the place anymore. It all seems like a 
dream.” 
Or as another Dalit respondent, KPS said: 
“Under the BJP’s government there are no riots…everybody is living in peace. 
Under BJP rule, we fear the police (law). This is the reason why the BJP 
continues in power. And secondly, over the last 10 years they have also 
developed this region….There are a lot of good roads now…” 
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The reference to the law is ironic, given that Dalits in contemporary Gujarat face ongoing 
discrimination in work and education, and are subject to various forms of social exclusion. A 
recent report by the Navsarjan Trust documented ninety-eight distinct practices ranging from 
physical touch to restricted access to jobs, public buildings and facilities, drinking water, and 
food, among others.
44
 These forms of discrimination are not, moreover, restricted to rural 
areas. Dalits in both rural and urban areas face high levels of violence, often at the hands of 
OBCs, and the rate of conviction in Gujarat is among the lowest in India. One could argue 
that it is advantageous for Dalits and poor OBCs to identify with the BJP, because in the 
absence of strong alternatives (a weak left and weak caste parties) they can gain tangible 
benefits in exchange for their support. While some of our respondents provided this rationale 
to explain their voting patterns, most indicated a more complex attachment to the idea of 
development. This illustrates the need to analyse voting patterns in ways that move beyond 
self-interest and exchange.  
KRD, of the low-caste community known as Vaghris, insisted that Gujarat is far more 
“developed” (vikasit) than other Indian States. He spoke approvingly of infrastructure 
improvements in Ahmedabad such as the number and quality of roads and a new Bus Rapid 
Transit System, of women being respected and able to walk without fear late at night, and of 
the absence of communal strife since 2002 in the city. The Vaghri community, traditionally 
associated with exchanging household utensils for discarded clothes, is ritually considered by 
upper caste members to be low but not untouchable. Yet Vaghri community leaders have 
campaigned for their group to be officially classified as “other backward” (OBC) so that 
members might benefit from affirmative action policies. KRD recalled the manner in which 
community leaders eventually succeeded in their campaign to include Vaghris under the 
official OBC category: “Modi gave us our identity,” he gushed. These policies have meant 
that KRD’s children were able to gain admission into University and have brighter prospects 
than anyone in his own generation ever had. Nonetheless, these changes have not made any 
difference to the continued discrimination his family has faced from their upper caste 
neighbours, who, he says, disrupt the flow of drinking water into their household taps. KRD 
and other Vaghri families have protested against the high handedness of their neighbours, but 
to no avail. Yet alignment with the BJP presents families like KRD’s with the opportunity to 
demonstrate to their upper caste neighbours as well as others their own upward social 
mobility. As MD, a young OBC former graduate student of sociology in one of the city’s 
premier institutions explained:   
The Congress Party is the party of the poor, the party of reservations. They did 
a good job of getting resources to the poor. But association with the Congress 
Party brings with it the stigma of being poor, of needing the support of 
reservations. Even though we benefit from it, we don’t want to be seen as 
such. Supporting the BJP is a way of telling others, hey, we are not poor! 
MD’s perspective on the BJP contrasts with the more sceptical view offered by PRD, a 
middle-aged Dalit and former mill worker:  
There is no doubt there has been development – there are roads, big malls, 
there are big cars, but if you look at the people, the support that people used to 
get from the government, Narendra Modi has reduced it to half….they wanted 
to show that there are no poor people in our state…  
His view was that Modi’s rule is defined by personal largesse, noting, “Narendra Modi holds 
this durbar, like he is doing us a favour.” Yet, while expressing views at odds with the 
dominant frame of development, PRD nevertheless prevaricated on the issue of security, 
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acknowledging, “There is an opinion that if there is Modi you will be safe from the Muslim.” 
He blamed the Congress government for the fact that “the Hindu public used to be subdued 
[while] the Muslim community… can be aggressive.”  
The juxtaposition of a violent past with the peaceful present (under the BJP) was voiced 
repeatedly by our respondents. The biggest worry KRD and his family reported is that their 
neighbourhood abuts an established and much larger Muslim neighbourhood: he fears that if 
the Congress Party were to return to power and there were a communal conflict, he and other 
Hindus would be killed. “They are our enemies. What else can you expect of them?” KRD’s 
eighteen-year old daughter asked matter-of-factly.  This interview provided an interesting 
account of the way in which a neo-middle class family partakes of the narrative of 
development, which they equate with the improved lives and status provided by affirmative 
action, a policy which many BJP policy-makers regard as an impediment to development. 
Despite facing caste-based discrimination from their neighbours, their antagonism remained 
directed against (and apparently reciprocated by) Muslims, whose proximity is seen as an 
existential threat. But even when Muslims are not spatially proximate, they are described in 
general terms as a source of violence and insecurity that hamper the putative developmental 
aspirations of the state.   
BC, a twenty-two year old Dalit who worked with five different employers sixteen hours a 
day six days a week, echoed these opinions. He found it stressful, he said, to drive his 
motorcycle through the Muslim-inhabited Juhapura area of the city. He said he was scared 
that even if he as much as grazes past a Muslim on the “congested streets in their locality”, 
they will be offended and pick a fight. If the city in general has come to epitomise 
development and security, Muslim-majority areas continue to be perceived by our Hindu 
respondents as sources of disorder and insecurity. BC’s hectic work schedule earned him 
enough to keep his seven-member family (his parents, wife and two children, and school-
going brother)  fed, clothed and housed, but with very little to save and invest. He 
emphasized the virtues of hard work and keeping his customers happy, avoiding any kind of 
confrontation with them. But Muslims are always on the lookout to create trouble, he 
asserted, and- with chilling matter-of-factness- added, “They got what they deserved in 
2002”.  
The anti-Muslim pogrom of 2002 emerged repeatedly in our interviews without prompting, 
suggesting that it was a key landmark in the larger story that our respondents wished to 
narrate about progress and development. Their sense of victors and losers in this story 
revolved around religious rather than caste-class antagonisms. Indeed the salience of this 
event in the popular imagination suggests how crucial the violence of 2002 was in 
inaugurating a new social order, a rupture from the previous intermittent rounds of violence 
in which it was impossible to pin down a decisive ‘victor’. As our Muslim respondent, MA 
from Juhapura suggested, “2002 was like the final round of a sixty-year old war. In 1941, the 
Muslims beat the Hindus. The Hindus had their revenge in 1969. But the tally was equalled. 
In 1985, they thrashed the Muslims again, but more lives were lost than properties. In 1990, 
they targeted Muslim properties but took fewer lives. In 2002, they established their 
complete, unassailable and total supremacy over us.” This event and its aftermath cannot be 
separated from the mundane understandings of development that our respondents presented 
to us. 
The invocation and subsequent mobilisation of this religious cleavage by the BJP in the 
context of marginalisation and insecurity for those living just above the poverty line suggests 
not so much a case of false consciousness but  a language that offers the means for improving 
oneself and one’s community. Our respondents generally sought to distance themselves from 
the idiom of caste although it was clear that caste defined almost every aspect of their daily 
lives. Yet as a grammar of protest or basis for political claims such as caste reservations the 
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importance of caste has declined. Put differently, caste-based claims appear to have less of a 
redistributive grammar and more of a claim for recognition. This echoes the distinction made 
by Fraser (2000) who suggests that this shift in grammar has occurred parallel to the decline 
of socialist politics. On the other hand the language of class, which historically has had a 
weak lineage in Gujarat, appeared only in the most general sense (such as to distinguish rich 
and poor) in some conversations. In place of both caste and class, the articulation of progress 
with religious nationalism offered a potentially new grammar of politics. As KN of the 
Devipujak caste in stated, “During the Congress era we had no status. Nobody knew 
us....people did not count us….Narendra Modi gave us a name, gave us a place in society, the 
name Devipujak. He gave us respect.” KN and his wife Laxmi were at pains to explain that 
after their inclusion by Modi in society caste did not really matter because, they claimed, the 
distinction between upper and lower caste had all but disappeared. It was Muslims, they 
argued, who continued to refer to them by their former name, Vaghri, which they consider 
derogatory.  Similar sentiments were expressed by M and her mother-in-law S, members of 
the pastoral Rabari caste, whose primary occupation is tending cows in the village-like 
enclosures of the city. As M put it, “The BJP is for us poor people and the Congress only 
listens to influential people. The BJP does not listen to the influential people. Hindutva is 
unity, where we are all one. We have unity within Hindus, but we cannot have that with 
Muslims. Because they are different. And will remain different.” M’s view, along with KRD 
and R’s, reflects how recognition rather than clientelism between the BJP and the poor 
ensures their support.  
Spatial Order 
The BJP’s cross-caste articulation has accompanied two major axes of socio-spatial ordering 
in Ahmedabad over the past decade, religion and class. This mirrors urban spatial inequality 
found in countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa.
45
  Our Hindu respondents 
suggested that order was ensured by residence in homogenous neighbourhoods where the 
chances of trouble and tension are reduced. For example, KRD spoke passionately about how 
life was better “ordered” now that he was living in a community of Hindus. KRD had moved 
to a Hindu majority neighbourhood a few months prior to the violence of 2002, and told us 
how grateful he was for that decision. He had previously lived in a Muslim-majority 
neighbourhood where, he said, he always had feared for his family’s safety.  Development 
processes need order and security, he contended, and such order can only be assured when 
“you are with one of your own” he added.  
That city residents increasingly link the spatial reordering of the city with the development 
process is evident from our interviews with individuals from other communities as well. For 
instance, BD, an OBC bus conductor on the municipal bus system, suggested that life had 
become more organised over the last decade. Both Hindu and Muslim respondents agreed 
that various neighbourhoods in the old city which they had vied to control for several decades 
were now socially homogenous. This, we were told, reduced threats to life and property, as 
people could now live with others like them. T, another OBC respondent, put this bluntly.  
“Development needs society to be organised (vyavasthit)” he said. “Organisation needs 
stability (sthirta). Stability is not possible in mixed communities.” Clearly, in the minds of at 
least some of our respondents, development is predicated on the homogenisation of separate 
social landscapes. In demanding socially homogenous neighbourhoods, our respondents 
appeared to have had in mind the social organisation provided by the pol, residential housing 
clusters that dot the old city which traditionally are organised along professional and caste 
lines. 
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In the aftermath of the 2002 violence, Ahmedabad, as well as other cities such as Surat and 
Baroda, experienced the social cleansing of formerly mixed neighbourhoods. The process of 
religious spatial segregation in India and is rooted in successive bouts of ethnic violence since 
the 1960s. Ostracized and isolated by their Hindu neighbours, Muslims of all socio-economic 
classes in Ahmedabad fled previously mixed neighbourhoods after 2002. They have settled  
primarily in Juhapura, now India’s largest Muslim ‘ghetto’, with approximately 400,000 
residents, and Usmanpur. These are areas many Hindus perceive as crime-ridden, unsafe and 
symbolic of the underdevelopment they feel they have left behind. How have Muslims 
experienced this new ordering of the city? SY, a 73 year old former postal worker moved to 
Juhapura in 2002 because, in his words, it “is a Muslim area, here we are safe.”  AR also 
moved to Juhapura after 2002.  He described his experience as follows:  
I had a house next to Gokuldham. In 2002, it got burnt. I did not get anything, 
neither from the Gujarat government not from the central government. I did 
not get anything from anyone. Instead, I was put in jail. They said that I was in 
the riot and put me in the jail. My house was burnt and the things were looted. 
My five children and I could not do anything. I also lodged a complaint 
regarding this in many places. In the last 15 years, I have not seen any kind of 
change. It is exactly the way it was. No matter which party is in the 
government, there is no support. Whatever has to be done, you have to do on 
your own. Neither have I heard anything from the government nor have I got 
anything from them. There are a lot of people in my situation. Not just one but 
many… those who have incurred total loss… their house was burnt… family 
members were killed…and yet nobody got anything. 
AR attested to the complete absence of infrastructure in the streets of Juhapura, something we 
also witnessed: roads marked by potholes, broken street lamps, piles of garbage and 
significantly, no shops or businesses in sight.  
There is no water supply… we get it from a hand pump. It is not clean … not 
good for drinking. We do not have that kind of income that we spend money 
to buy Bisleri water… or boil it and filter it… we do not have that kind of 
income… a water filter, only people who have money can afford it… it costs 
Rs 4-5000. About the roads after 7 pm you cannot go out… if you go out after 
7 pm it is very difficult especially for the old people.  Some people have put 
stones and other things on it… so when you walk… you cannot walk 
straight… it is difficult to balance… everyday one person or the other slips 
here. There is no light on the street… if the houses nearby give light it would 
be good… but then they will have to pay the bill, so it is absolutely dark at 
night.  
[Picture 2 here] 
[Caption: Wall separating Juhapura from the predominantly Hindu neighbourhood of 
Shri Krishna nagar] 
[Picture 3 here] 
[Caption: Juhapura 2012] 
This form of spatial marginalization is actively reinforced by the state at the local level. Arif  
According to Arif, “Four years back there was heavy rain and the water came right inside the 
house. So we went to the corporation… it was municipality then… … they were Hindus and 
we are Muslims… they said to us – “you do not need to work here.” 
Modi’s flagship bus transit system (BRTS) does not reach Juhapura, so it is effectively 
severed from the rest of the city. Yet it is no small irony that this segregation together with 
opportunities for international investments from Gulf States has enabled high-rise properties 
to be built along the major road linking Juhapura to the rest of Ahmedabad. Rich Muslim 
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investors hold Muslim-only property shows, while younger Muslims with accumulated 
savings are constructing a parallel world of business opportunities.  
The entrepreneurialism of young Muslims in ghettoized areas of Ahmedabad was echoed by 
others outside Juhapura, although clearly the demarcation of views within the Muslim 
community about the BJP and development reflect class and occupational divisions. For 
example RF, a welder in Shahpur, was far less critical of Modi and development than other 
Muslims. According to him, business had been good in the past 10 years due to the property 
boom, as 75 percent of his business was in the new riverfront complex.  This boom had 
enabled him to purchase high-tech welding equipment and save quite a bit of money. For him 
development was real, as he had more opportunities for work and his life was better.  He 
recalled the 2002 violence as a frightening episode that cost him six months of wages, but 
also something he had overcome through hard work. Conversely, he had little sympathy for 
the unemployed: “There is work everywhere. But [the unemployed] are lazy and some have 
alcohol addictions. Many work because they have to and then they come home and take it out 
on their wives. But those who want to earn can find work.” RF is an example of Muslims and 
lower caste men and women who differentiate between those they believe are the recalcitrant 
poor and poor but self-improving citizens. Yet, as we have shown, many of our respondents 
were more ambivalent about linking development and order. Despite the resonance of the 
broader development discourse with their concerns about security, identity and spatial order 
they expressed at the same time a sense of dissonance with their material existence.  
Precariousness and Displacement 
Our respondents’ conflation of development, security, identity and spatial ordering should be 
situated against two crucial transformations. First is the increasing material precariousness of 
life among members of what the BJP labels the neo-middle class. Despite the obvious 
infrastructure improvements in Ahmedabad and establishment of special economic zones 
(SEZs)
46
 on the city outskirts, employment and labour market indicators show increased 
precariousness of life and livelihood. All of our respondents, whether Dalit, OBC or Muslim,  
lived in pucca (built) houses with access to electricity, piped water, medical care and 
sufficient food. Many had saved for these amenities with great difficulty, often moving out of 
poorer neighbourhoods which they associated with danger and dirt.  Their material 
circumstances were far better than what they had left behind. The Dalits we spoke to in 
Naroda aspired to send their children to private schools, citing the inadequacy of state 
schools. Yet being able to eke out enough for private school tuition simply raised their level 
of precariousness. A large number of our respondents drove rickshaws for a living, which 
provides about INR 5000 to 6000 each month. This is barely enough to feed and clothe a 
family of four.  Illness and injury brought devastating effects on families who were forced to 
borrow from friends and family. Official data corroborate this. The proportion of regular 
wage earners in urban Gujarat fell from 452 per 1000 households in 2008 to 425 per 1000 in 
2012. However, what really demonstrates the increased insecurity of work is the sharp rise in 
the proportion of casual labour households from 115 per 1000 to 160 during this same 
period.
47
  
Aside from increased casualization in the urban economy of Gujarat driven by the virtual 
collapse of the textile industry, a key factor that is contributing to the marginalization of 
lower caste, working class people is the on-going restructuring of the city which has led to 
growing evictions and relocations to remote areas. This restructuring is motivated by the 
freeing up of prime property in the heart of the city for commercial interests, and the needs of 
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the middle classes for spaces of leisure and pleasure. To that end, informal settlements have 
been declared to be illegal and their inhabitants evicted under anachronistic laws.
48
 A 
discussion of how marginalized communities make sense of, and experience the material and 
discursive practices of development would be incomplete without a consideration of the far-
reaching effects of urban restructuring. 
Displacement of the poor by urban renewal projects in the name of development have been 
studied in Ahmedabad
49
 and elsewhere in India.
50
 For instance, in 2002, over 400 families of 
the low-caste Baori community in Ramdevnagar in the western suburbs of Ahmedabad were 
evicted and their homes demolished because authorities claimed their settlement encroached 
on public property.
51
 Beautification projects have been undertaken at enormous cost to the 
public exchequer involving the eviction and relocation of thousands of people. For instance, 
the 1200 crores
52
 Sabarmati Riverfront Development (SRD) Project is estimated to have 
affected more than 14000 households.
53
 Similarly, the Kankaria Development Project has 
effectively privatized Kankaria Lake, a popular picnicking spot in the city.  
[Place photo 4 here]  
[Caption: The Sabarmati Riverfront] 
The intended orderliness of the city, informing and informed by a notion of development that 
is intended to consciously forge social order, contrasts with the ruptures in the lives of the 
displaced and the evicted. How do poor and working class Dalits, OBCs and Muslims 
respond to these projects? While talking about the major changes that he had seen in the city 
over the last two decades, 25-year-old SR, who owns a franchise for distributing mineral 
water explained:  
The in-city and the out-city [referring respectively to the areas within the 
municipal limits and outside of it] are no longer in step with one another. If 
you are in-city, you have everything: parks, gardens, the river, flyovers, public 
transport, security, everything. If you are here, in the out-city, you have 
nothing, except the highway….everything is organised there, here it’s the 
opposite. 
Evictees from the Sabarmati Riverfront now live in Ganesh Nagar, a temporary camp. The 
camp is near a huge landfill and the area has little transportation. We interviewed one evictee, 
MJ, who makes leather items and toys. During the forty-five years he lived along the 
Sabarmati Riverfront before the development project began, he would display his wares on 
the pavement of the iconic Ellisbridge.
54
  Although the police would threaten him at times, he 
and other vendors knew how to evade or deal with them. Public transport was relatively 
convenient, and his commute took about half an hour on foot. Although his tenement on the 
riverfront was illegal, its central location and the proximity to his place of work had been 
extremely advantageous. But displacement had separated him away from his market. New 
customers were difficult to come by, as his neighbours did not have the money to buy the 
kind of leisure products he sold. The highway abutting the Ganesh Nagar camp connected the 
city with far-flung rural areas so pedestrians (potential customers) were rare. Of course, MJ 
was very resilient. After recounting the circumstances under which his family and neighbours 
were relocated, he remarked that it was now time for him to think of another trade. But, he 
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added, things would change again when they would be dispatched to their eventual homes, so 
he may as well wait. In concluding, he remarked, “The city has become orderly. At least, now 
the government can give us our homes.” 
The restructuring of work and urban space in Ahmedabad has been accompanied not only by 
a rhetoric of order but also a sense of loss of collective spaces of engagement that 
disappearing forms of work had enabled. This was particularly acute for the older generation 
of workers. For instance, according to 57-year-old AN of Naroda, the textile mills that once 
employed so many workers were not merely sites where their labour was exchanged for 
wages, but also enabled the forging of distinct and novel social relations, caste discrimination 
notwithstanding. Daily engagements, negotiations with managers, and collective actions and 
disputes over wages enabled workers to provide political meaning to their shared lives, an 
opportunity younger people would never experience. 57-year-old ND, who had been as a 
low-level clerk in the Postal Department, lamented the loss of these collective experiences 
since his involuntary retirement fifteen years ago. Although he had received severance 
package, this was no substitute for the social relations forged at his workplace.  
Another respondent, KR, provided a striking demonstration of these ruptures. The son of ND, 
he is a tailor who operates his own business from his bedroom in the family’s three-room 
tenement in Vatva in south-east Ahmedabad.  After his father lost his job with the Postal 
Department, KD tried to buy a house, but could not, partly because his father got no help and 
partly “because of bad luck.” In 2001, the family moved to Ahmedabad, where they lived as 
tenants in three different locations along the river bank until they were relocated in 2006 to 
make way for the Riverfront Development Project. They lived for seven months in Ganesh 
Nagar, in the same camp settlement as MJ. However, as their final home was not ready yet, 
they rented a house allotted to another evictee from their old neighbourhood. Their landlord 
provided no rent receipts, which meant they had no proof of residence and thus could not 
access public services and other entitlements. “We have no document, and hence have no 
existence,” he rued. His anger mounted as he spoke:  
No doubt much has changed. But life for the poor has remained the same. 
There will always be 20 percent rich, 40 percent middle-class and 40 percent 
poor. The government and society need 40 percent to remain poor. Who else 
will do all the manual work, the scavenging, the carrying of night soil, labour 
in the mills, provide cheap clothes, furniture and domestic work. To develop, 
they need the poor (vikas ke liye gareeb chahiye). The poor become even more 
poor. Those who can be a little better off skim all the opportunities to become 
even better-off. The River Front, the BRTS, the Kankaria waterfront- all these 
[development projects] have benefitted those who can afford walks, expensive 
bus rides, leisure. Not us. We are tossed around, to be eventually dumped in 
this godforsaken place. Yes, there might be secure housing now. But all the 
while, we have been paying the price for something we don’t even benefit 
from. 
Another respondent, GC, who had suffered a major injury at work, was relocated much 
further from work to make way for the city’s new bus system (BRTS). According to him 
“there is development … that is why we have been dumped here. It is because of progress 
that we are suffering. Development has nothing to do with us.”  
Such fragments of subaltern consciousness were evident among many interviewees, 
especially Dalits.  Their anger and despondency revealed that despite support for the idea of 
development among some of them, the harsh material circumstances of their lives were rarely 
far from view.  
Contingent Articulations 
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These interview fragments do not alone answer the question of why the BJP has continued to 
win election after election in the state. But by shedding light on how the Hindutva-
development ideological complex has marked the subjectivities of working and lower middle 
class Dalits and OBCs in Ahmedabad, these anecdotes offer on-the-ground evidence of how 
the BJP’s articulation project linking Hindutva, development and order has gained traction 
among subaltern classes. Indeed at one level the dominance of the BJP since the 1990s 
reflects not only the ineptitude of the Congress Party and the weakness of political 
alternatives, but the ability of the BJP to make such connections resonate. This is limited, 
however, by two key conditions:  the politics of caste and the precariousness of labour.  
Caste fissures are still central to the re-articulation of anti-Muslim solidarities, but unlike 
during the 1980s it is not a shared sentiment against upper caste Patels. Instead, conflicts 
between Dalits and OBCs have emerged. All our caste Hindu respondents lived in 
neighbourhoods where neither Muslims nor Dalits were allowed. OBCs claimed Dalits were 
“unclean” and engaged in “dirty” occupations such as scavenging, cleaning toilets and 
sweeping streets. But Dalit sentiment against OBCs was equally strident. 
“OBCs are violent, not Brahmins…if a Dalit’s son  marries a Brahmin or Bania, then [they] 
would not come to kill us with a scythe…[but] if our son falls in love with a Rabari, Thakor, 
Vaghri or Darbar’s daughter, they would come to kill us,” said one respondent.55 
We did not detect a sense of weakness or perception of oppression on the part of Dalit 
respondents when speaking about OBCs; instead, in their eyes OBCs were reaching far 
beyond their station.  
There is no comparison to our way of living…we are level in terms of 
education, money…even then according to the old ways they oppress us. They 
are smaller, lower than us, that’s how they make it, but…I don’t let them into 
my house….They don’t even bathe, even then they say to us, we are bigger 
than you…where they go to the toilet, that’s the place they drink water from 
(this was followed by much laughter).  
The friction and hostility between Dalits and OBCs suggests that dynamic antagonisms may 
certainly be present within political articulations, even as they enable a degree of political 
stability for the BJP.  Dalit ambivalence towards the BJP is evident in these interviews.   
Contingent support for its security agenda and some agreement that the BJP is a party of 
development often went hand in hand with anger and despondency. The OBCs we spoke to, 
on the one hand, expressed strong pro-BJP sentiments in keeping with their inclusion in the 
articulation project. Yet, when the conversation turned to their livelihoods a far more 
ambivalent sentiment emerged. Some argued that they were squeezed between the welfare 
policies of the Congress Party that primarily benefited Dalits, and the pro-rich bias of the 
BJP. In particular, OBC educational achievements were seen to have been of little use to 
them, given that many of the young remained jobless. While self-identifying as middle class, 
their position appeared more akin to a neo-middle class position, i.e. a more unstable and 
precarious class position. 
As GDP, an OBC and former lathe machine worker stated: 
What is the point of believing in the BJP? What benefits did we get? Our 
children have a higher education but they still do not have jobs. There is still 
high unemployment out there….we are left behind…ST and SC communities 
get all the benefits. OBC is a vast community and has 137 sub-castes. The 
government provided 27 percent of reservations for them but it is not enough. 
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..[while] the ST and SC have a small population and get many benefits…for 
such a small community they have 40 percent of reservations. It is not fair. 
His friend sitting next to him agreed: “We feel sad that our children worked so hard, studied 
so much but they still do not have a job. There are so many vacancies in the government but 
you will only get the job if you bribe them.” He explained that it was Prajapatis (his caste) 
who most took advantage of reservations in education, yet added, “‘the government does not 
give us a job, and if it gives us a job it does not give us our entire salary. You have to spend 
your entire life in the middle-class.” 
He added: 
All the middle class people have the same dilemma. Because of this, people in 
our caste start to question whether there is any point in spending money and 
time on a higher education. The young generation began deviating away from 
the teaching profession and chose…other businesses. The BJP created this 
condition. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the question of how people identify with big development projects, and 
how and why they resist or seek improvement within this order. We employed the concept of 
articulation to show how parties (or other agents) can play a critical role in creating 
identification with national development strategies through the micro and macro-politics of 
ethnicity and class. Our interviews in Ahmedabad suggest that men and women who live at 
the margins and struggle with insecure work express at times strong support for the project of 
‘development,’ which appeared to fulfil a range of demands for caste mobility, progress, 
order, security and belonging.  
These interviews reveal a mixture of contingent support, resignation, anger and ambivalence 
in the ongoing formation of subaltern political subjectivity in urban Gujarat. These interviews 
suggest, albeit as an initial observation, that the development-Hindutva discursive formation, 
coupled with ongoing economic changes in Gujarat, has not led to a clear hegemony of the 
BJP among subaltern groups. Many respondents felt that development has not brought much 
hope or material progress in their lives. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence of a 
resistant subaltern consciousness. The idea of ‘development’ has been appropriated and 
filtered into popular consciousness through mundane concerns about security, identity and 
spatial order, in which religion rather than material progress is a common referent. Yet many 
of our respondents suggested that the ordering of their lives through greater security, 
recognition of their identities and homogeneity of space was an improvement and a sign of 
progress. We characterise this as a form of ambivalence, showing neither full acceptance of 
nor resistance to the claims and discourses of the dominant classes. Similar forms of 
ambivalence have been observed in the anti-austerity resistance movement in Greece, which 
simultaneously critiques the hegemonic imposition of economic measures and assumptions, 
yet “recycles” the xenophobia and “crypto-colonial” identification of Greece with Europe.56 
In both contexts, this demonstrates that even as critiques of hegemonic narratives and 
discourse emerge within subaltern populations, they are ambivalent in relation to extant 
power and rarely isolated from the hegemonic positions of the powerful. However, it would 
be incorrect to argue that the subordinated fully absorb or appropriate the world views and 
values of the dominant. Thus we may not gain much analytically by contrasting resistance 
with hegemony. Instead, scholars need to more closely address the ambivalence of 
subordinated groups, among whom social differentiation in the context of neoliberalization 
continually threatens to weaken social solidarities. 
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The broader implications of our analysis stem from the 2014 national electoral victory of the 
BJP, and the notion among many scholars and policy-makers that the developmental model in 
Gujarat represents the possible future of capitalism in India.  
Yet articulations are neither seamless nor contingent. Gujarat voting data shows that there has 
been no further drift of the OBCs and Dalits towards the BJP, which suggests it has reached 
its limit with these groups. What helps the BJP is the absence of a credible alternative. It is 
important to bear in mind that the historical continuity and consolidation of 
developmentalism in Gujarat, across regimes and under different conditions has required 
periodic renewal, despite the weakness of formal associationalism among the labouring poor. 
The consolidation of upper caste-class hegemony has, in fact, not been as seamless or 
automatic as might appear; at various points under Congress leadership during the 1970s as 
well as after the rupture led by the BJP during the 1980s, new articulations emerged to take 
the place of Nehruvian socialism. The discourse and rhetoric of development as forcefully 
propelled forward by Modi’s BJP since the mid-1990s has surpassed an exclusively upper 
caste order. This articulation project has shifted the previous preoccupation with caste 
hierarchy towards one in which a religion-based sensibility that emphasizes a form of society 
in which security, order and progress are synonymous predominates. This does not mean that 
caste distinctions or caste consciousness have disappeared, but rather their appeal for protest 
politics has been replaced by a competitive politics of recognition. Yet the mixed feelings 
about the Hindutva-development project evoked among our respondents offers a hint that 
these articulation projects may well have failed if alternative modes of organization had 
emerged among the lower castes, or if the Congress Party had shown more decisive and 
imaginative leadership during the crucial turning point of the mid-1980s. In other words, 
there is nothing pre-determined about the success of articulations. This is because 
articulations are premised on constructing homogeneity out of the heterogeneity of demands. 
The current articulations in Gujarat are threatened by the conditions produced by global 
capitalism itself, which creates a deep ambivalence among subjects who feel they are just 
outside the reach of its promised fruit.  
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